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Abstract 
 
Business angels are widely recognized as a significant source of entrepreneurial finance, 
particularly for early stage businesses. However, rigorous investigation on angel investment 
performance has been limited. This paper examines investment returns of business angels in 
addressing the question of whether angel investing generates attractive returns. We review the few 
published studies which report on more than 100 investment exits to establish baseline returns 
expectations and clarify returns measurement limitations. We then use data from one of the largest 
studies of angel returns to populate a monte carlo simulation of returns profiles based on portfolio 
size and other key characteristics. The simulation explores the link between portfolio size and the 
probability of the desired level of returns. The study reveals that angel deal returns are highly 
skewed; smaller portfolios have higher average returns but dramatically lower median returns. In 
contrast with prior studies, our study shows that portfolios with more than 50 investments are 
required to significantly minimize risk of poor returns and that similar scale is required to 
maximize returns potential, as smaller portfolios have a lower average internal rate of return (IRR). 
We show that reinvestment rate is a critical element in measuring angel returns and we demonstrate 
the limitations of IRR as a returns metric through the simulation. We compare findings against 
returns from venture capital (VC) investing and discuss theoretical, practitioner and policy 
implications. 
 
Key words: business angels, investment returns, portfolio size, policy implications  
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The market for early-stage investments has grown dramatically in the past decade with the rise of 
the business angel investor, who typically makes small investments in early-stage ventures (Kim 
and Wagman, 2016). Formal angel investments in the United States are estimated to exceed $20 
billion annually, roughly half the total of institutional venture capital (VC), with recognition that 
angels fund more businesses that VCs because average deal size is smaller (NVCA 2016; CVR 
2015). Many scholars believe that the informal angel market is significantly under-measured (Kerr 
et al, 2014; Wiltbank, 2005). 
 
Despite the growth of angel investing and its importance in funding early stage ventures, rigorous 
investigation on angel returns has been limited, compared to studies on VC performance (e.g. 
Capizzi, 2015; Wiltbank et al, 2009; Shane, 2008, 2009; Mason and Harrison, 2002; 2008), 
especially from a portfolio perspective. This is partly due to the inherent challenge of collecting 
data on angel investments (Mason and Harrison, 2002; 2008) and divergent opinions on how to 
measure returns (Capizzi, 2015). 
 
Evaluating angel investment performance is important for a number of different stakeholder 
groups. For scholars of entrepreneurial finance, angel investing appears disadvantaged compared 
to professional VC investing. Angel activities face high coordination costs, limited access to 
information, reduced negotiating power, and limited follow-on investing potential (e.g. Wiltbank 
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et al, 2015, 2009; Van Osnabrugge, 2000). Angels appear to invest in the higher risk, early-stage 
market, where VC funds are much less active (Mason and Stark, 2004). Studies of long-term VC 
returns report highly skewed results, in which the top quartile of investments drive total portfolio 
results (Ball et al 2011; PWC-NVCA, 2015). Assuming angel investing results are similar, it is 
unclear whether angel investments generate rewards commensurate with the risks. 
 
For angel investors, better understanding of exits and portfolio investing could improve investment 
decision-making and potentially attract more high net-worth individuals to become angels. One 
question that remains elusive in the literature is under what conditions do angels make money from 
their investment exits? (Mason et al, forthcoming). 
 
For policy makers, entrepreneurial activity is hindered by the so-called ‘equity funding gap’ 
(Cumming, 2005). High-growth ventures (referred to as ‘gazelles’) often require more capital than 
founders can source from family and friends, but less than VC round minimums (Sohl, 2003). 
Regional economic activity may suffer when angel activity is unnecessarily suppressed or 
ineffective, especially if angels cannot reinvest exit-based returns into new ventures. (Mason and 
Harrison, 2006). This is particularly the case following the collapse of the so-called funding 
escalator following the 2007-08 global financial crisis (Harrison 2013; North et al 2013; Harrison 
and Baldock 2015). One question arising from the literature is whether or not policy makers should 
subsidize angel investing to support regional economic and job growth if angels are not generating 
appropriate risk-adjusted returns (Mason and Brown, 2013; Gregson et al, 2013; Shane, 2009).  
 
In this study, we review ten published studies which report on more than 100 investment exits and 
utilize monte carlo simulation to more rigorously explore angel investing returns. By varying 
portfolio size and investment timing, we can more carefully assess the risk-reward profile of angel 
investment activity. We use data from the largest of the ten studies, the Angel Investor 
Performance Project (AIPP) dataset, which collected information from 539 angel investors, to 
populate our monte carlo simulation. Each “profile” comprises 9000 portfolios and more than 2 
million randomized investments selected from the dataset. By comparing profiles across 
characteristics of interest, we can systematically address unresolved questions about angel 
investing returns. 
 
Our findings align with prior research showing that increasing portfolio size reduces risk and 
provides more stable returns. However, in contrast with prior studies, our study shows that 
portfolios with more than 50 investments are required to significantly minimize risk of poor returns 
and that similar scale is required to maximize returns potential, as smaller portfolios have a lower 
average internal rate of return (IRR). This is significantly larger than previously suggested (12-20 
investments) and exceeds the capabilities of the vast majority of most angel investors and angel 
investing groups. We report returns using both IRR and MIRR (modified IRR). We discuss the 
benefits and drawbacks of these returns metrics and show that key policy and practice implications 
can be derived from the simulation and analysis. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a background to the study and relevant 
literature. Section 3 then reviews and compares the results of prior studies on angel investment 
returns. The dataset and simulation method is described in Section 4. Section 5 discusses 
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simulation results, followed by Section 6, which discusses the implications of findings for theory, 
practice, and policy. Section 7 provides conclusions, study limitations and suggestions for further 
research. 
 
2 Background to Study 
 
A business angel (‘angel’) is a high net-worth individual investing personal funds in privately held 
companies, usually start-ups (Mason and Harrison, 1996). Angel investments often address the 
“equity funding gap,” investing more than entrepreneurs can raise from their own resources but 
less than the minimum investment threshold of VC funds (Sohl, 2003; Cumming, 2005).. The gap 
is generally accepted to range from approximately $100,000 to $5 million, depending on region 
(Sohl, 2003), and represents the absence of small amounts of risk capital from institutional sources 
for early-stage companies.  
 
Angels that invest personal funds have the flexibility to choose deals for nonfinancial as well as 
financial reasons and compared to venture capitalists (VCs), have no pressure to maximize 
investment returns or exit within a particular time horizon (Mason and Harrison, 2008). A smaller 
percentage of angels only invest in high-potential ventures; some angel groups focus entirely on 
high-risk/high-reward ventures. These groups are typically more sophisticated and professional 
regarding their investment practices (Gregson et al, 2013; Mason et al, 2006). 
 
Angels have attracted increasing attention from policy makers as important actors in regional 
economic development, as they are shown to invest in more new businesses than VC (Mason et 
al, 2013; Gregson et al, 2013). However, there has been little systematic evaluation of the costs to 
government of supporting risk capital or evidence-based analysis of preferred mechanisms for 
government intervention in angel investing (Da Rin et al, 2011). By comparison, numerous studies 
on venture capital inform policy. For example, Puri and Zarutskie (2011), using US Census data, 
find that only 0.11% of new companies created over a 25 year sample period from 1981-2005 are 
funded by VC, yet these companies account for 4% to 5.5% of employment. They show that VC-
backed companies grow faster at every stage of the investment cycle, i.e., both before and after the 
receipt of VC. 
 
2.1 Portfolio Investing 
 
Angels also engage in the pooling of funds or investment syndication, in addition to investing as 
individuals. Pooling or syndication attempts to diversify investments and reduce overall risk 
exposure (Brander et al, 2002), without giving up individual control over investment decisions. In 
the US, angel syndicates are a growing source of funding for new and emerging businesses seeking 
investments under $1million (Sohl, 2012). In the UK, angel syndication has been shown to yield 
larger investment deals, more follow-on investments, but fewer new investments and fewer exits 
(Gregson et al, 2013). Most angel returns data has been generated from angel groups, which engage 
in more formalized data gathering and reporting than individual angels; a topic that we will discuss 
further in the paper. 
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A key unresolved question in the literature relates to investment portfolio diversification. There is 
no definitive benchmark for how many investments are required to improve the risk/reward profile. 
Some prior studies suggest a minimum of 12 to 20 investments (Teten 2013; Wiltbank, 2012). In 
contrast with such predictions, this paper draws on portfolio theory to hypothesize that much larger 
portfolios are required to provide protection against returns variability and to significantly decrease 
low IRR portfolio outcomes.  
 
2.2 Measuring Angel Investment Returns 
 
A common ‘metric’ to measure and compare investment returns since the early days of private 
equity has been internal rate of return (IRR) (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Freear et al, 1995). Both 
VC and angel communities have adopted IRR as the primary method for measuring the 
effectiveness of investments and for comparison purposes (Wiltbank & Boeker, 2007; 
Aernoudt, 2005; Wiltbank, 2005; Mason & Harrison, 2002). IRR provides annualized rates 
of return and a value weighted measurement that takes into consideration the timing of cash 
contributions and distributions (Johnstone 2008).  
 
The fundamental problem with IRR as a metric is the underlying assumption that positive cash 
flows are effectively reinvested at the same rate of return (Phalippou 2008). IRR calculations are 
highly sensitive to the timing of cash outflows and a large pay-out after a longer time period can 
work out to a lower IRR than smaller, but quicker, pay-outs that result in less cash returned overall 
to investors. Similarly, a second investment round just prior to the sale of the company, which 
generates a return almost immediately, can have a much higher IRR than an earlier investment, 
even if the earlier investment was at a much lower valuation and had a higher exit multiple. This 
illustrates the time element of the IRR calculation, where investments that tie up cash longer are 
punished (Chemmanur and Chen, 2014). Da Rin et al (2011) suggest that IRR provides an 
incentive to exit investments soon, even at the cost of forcing an outcome whose rate of return is 
lower.  
 
In the case of angel investing, the use of IRR implicitly requires that cash inflows will be 
redeployed to more angel investments or an alternate asset class with a comparable risk-reward 
profile. Given that (1) angel investing is understood to have high variation in returns and (2) that 
the market for angel investing is very imperfect, with limited deal flow in most geographic areas, 
this assumption appears prima facie flawed. 
 
To overcome IRR distortions, a modified IRR (MIRR) can be adopted, which is a variation of net 
present value (NPV) that is typically expressed as a rate of return (Da Rin et al, 2011). MIRR 
employs a discount rate derived from the fund’s cash flows and measures the growth in net worth 
due to the investment, so that there is a number at the beginning and one at the end of the 
investment (Phalippou, 2008). This addresses the issue of nonconventional cash flows, as the IRR 
calculation assumes that cash flows are reinvested each year at a constant rate. However, MIRR is 
not as widely used in comparative angel or VC returns studies as IRR. MIRR presents a different 
measurement problem in the specific context of portfolio-based angel investing due to the extended 
time frame of the portfolio (likely greater than 15 years). The reinvestment rate required for MIRR 
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analysis may dominate other returns effects, as will be seen in the simulation results and discussed 
later in the paper. 
 
2.3 Additional Measurement Challenges 
 
Computing financial returns requires good data and a solid methodology that is widely shared by 
researchers (Da Rin et al, 2011) and both these requirements are challenged in angel returns 
research. Angels do not track IRR in a consistent manner, and many do not track return rates 
at all (Wiltbank, 2005). In order to standardize IRR calculations, data should include the date 
of investment, amount of investment, date of liquidity event or revaluation of investment, and 
value of the return. Even then, IRR as an investment returns metric has its own challenges, as 
described above. Concerns over uneven disclosure of returns and data quality are also identified 
with VC studies (Harris et al, 2014; Da Rin et al, 2011; Gompers et al, 2005). 
 
The confidential nature of angel investing and differences in investment criteria amongst angels 
contribute to the difficulty in gathering and comparing angel returns data (Shane, 2009). Angels 
may intentionally keep a low profile and angel data that is self-reported may induce under-
reporting of poorly performing investments. Public reporting therefore tends to focus on larger, 
syndicated deals, which can bias available data samples.  
 
Methods to gather and compare angel returns data using either a cross-sectional or time series 
approach can also be highly problematic (Mason and Harrison, 2002). Survey response rates have 
generally been low, suggesting self-selection and non-response biases that might skew results 
(Kollmann and Kuckertz, 2009). Some scholars caution that studies of angel returns are subject to 
systematic, unreported and for the most part unacknowledged upward bias (Cumming and Walz 
2010; Cochrane, 2005). 
 
2.4 Comparing Angel and VC Returns 
 
Comparisons between angel and VC returns also requires caution, in acknowledging differences 
in investment practices. While angels make their own investment decisions, VCs follows a Limited 
partnership model, whereby investors (i.e. Limited Partners: LPs) provide fund managers (i.e. 
General Partners: GPs) with funding, but have no say in investment decisions. GPs are under 
pressure to source deals in the early years of a fund and achieve returns within a finite time period 
(typically 10-12 years), requiring a high volume of potential deal sourcing (Gray et al, 2015; 
Gregson, 2014). VC is described as a ‘hits-driven’ business, where a few significant returns can 
offset losses from the majority of investments (Ball et al, 2011).  
 
Gompers and Lerner (2000) suggest that there is a limited number of favourable (i.e. high-return) 
VC investments that has to be matched with a fluctuating capital supply; giving way to the so-
called ‘money chasing deals’ phenomenon. Comparisons between VC and angel returns should 
also account for the management fees charged by VCs, which are calculated on committed capital 
(typically 2.0-2.5%) but charged on called capital; the total amount of issued capital for which 
shareholders are required to pay (Mulcahy et al, 2012).  
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One question is the extent to which ex-ante differences between angels and VCs affect exit returns. 
Kerr et al (2014) observe that angels engage in efficient selection and screening just as traditional 
VCs do, while Cosh et al (2009) find that angels invest in ventures that exhibit similar 
characteristics as those in which VCs invest. Chemmanur and Chen (2014), postulate that if 
researchers can control for measure of value-adding activities of VCs and angels, then there should 
be no difference in an angel’s or VC’s portfolio exit rates. Schwienbacher (2009) argues that angels 
and VCs can both play value-adding roles, but that the key difference is that VCs have sufficient 
capital to refinance a company, whereas angels do not.  
 
Different ‘demand side’ dynamics between angels and VCs may also influence returns. For 
example, it is suggested that angel financing is chosen by entrepreneurs because VC financing is 
simply unavailable in the early stages of the firm (Hellmann and Thiele, 2014). Studies confirm 
that VCs have shifted away from early-stage investing towards larger and later stage deals and 
tend not to invest in deals that seek less than three or four million dollars (OECD, 2011; Sohl, 
2012). The pecking-order theory (e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984) suggests that entrepreneurs seek 
financing in an order that minimizes ownership dilution, with debt financing preferred, but 
typically unavailable for early-stage ventures, and angel funding preferred to VC.  
 
3 Prior Studies of Angel Returns 
 
In this section, we review the limited number of angel studies to determine what they collectively 
reveal about angel returns. Table 1 summarises ten major studies which each report on more than 
100 investment exits and which offer a higher level of statistical relevance than studies using much 
smaller samples. It can be seen that US and UK studies dominate the sample, which is not 
surprising, given that most large angel groups and syndicates are located in these two countries.  
 
For our discussion, we identify corrected IRRs reported in the literature subsequent to release of 
the the original AIPP dataset (2007), which attempt to improve upon original IRR calculations. 
The differences between reported IRRs in original and corrected publications are not substantial 
(under two percentage points difference) in the context of this paper. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Investment Returns in Angel Studies (n>100 investments) 
 
Year of 
Study 
Author(s) Total 
Investments 
Exited 
Investments 
IRR 
2013 US  DeGennaro & Dwyer: "Expected 
Returns… by Angel Investors in 
Groups" 
588 419 69.9% 
2010 US Roach: "Keiretsu Forum" 120 Unknown 15-33% 
2009 UK  Wiltbank: "Siding with the Angels“ 1,080 406 24.6% 
2009 US  Band of Angels 200+ Unknown 18.0% 
2009 US  DeGennaro & Dwyer: "Expected 
Returns to Angel Investors"  
603 434 33.0% 
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2008-present 
US  
Sohl: "The Angel Investor Market in 
the US (Annual Report)  
Unknown Unknown 20-30% 
2007-2012 
Italy 
Capizzi, : “The returns of business 
angel investments” 
553 143 17.6% 
2007 US  Villalobos & Payne: "Startup Pre-
Money Valuation"  
117 117 24.3% 
2007 US  Wiltbank & Boeker: "Returns to Angel 
Investors in Groups" (AIPP) 
3,097 1,137 31.4% 
2002 UK  Mason & Harrison: "Is it worth it? The 
Rates of Return from Informal VC” 
372 128 37.4% 
  
What do previous studies reveal about angel returns? Two of the studies offer a range of IRRs 
rather than a calculated IRR. Sohl’s annual study of US angel investment activity (University of 
New Hampshire Centre for Venture Research), finds that IRRs range from 20% to 30%, but this 
research does not provide details of return calculations such as holding period for investments, the 
sample size, or the unit of analysis for the investment.  
 
The 2010 Roach study is of particular interest, as the study reported an investment failure rate of 
only 20%; lower than the rate of start-up failure in the U.S. The low failure rate and moderate but 
consistent returns (IRR range of 15-33%) suggest potential benefits to a diversified, portfolio 
approach to group-based angel investing. The Keiretsu Forum invests in a broader range of sectors, 
including non-technology opportunities such as real estate and incorporates investments across 
geographically dispersed chapters.  
 
The DeGennaro and Dwyer study (2009) utilized a subset of the AIPP dataset reported in other 
studies, but the study restricted data to facilitate cash-based IRR calculations. This appears to have 
biased the data subset to higher returns investments; resulting in an average IRR of 69.9%.  
 
Setting aside the DeGennaro and Dwyer, Sohl and Roach studies, the remaining seven studies in 
Table 1 show a range of returns between 17.6 and 37.4 percent, with an average IRR of 26.6%. 
The largest study, the 2007 Angel Investor Performance Project (AIPP), collected information 
from 539 angel investors who were members of 86 angel investor groups and who had experienced 
1,137 exits from their investments. Over half the exits (52%) lost money (less than 1x return) while 
7% of exits returned over 10x the original investment.  
 
Original IRR calculations for the AIPP data yielded an IRR of 27%. However, Wiltbank and 
Boeker (2007) calculated average return by weighting each investment the same, regardless of 
time to exit (an issue identified by DeGenarro & Dwyer, 2009). Revised calculations by Right Side 
Capital Management (RSCM, 2010) used the average return multiple (2.6x) and the average 
holding period (3.5 years), which yields an IRR of 31.4%; suggesting that the original approach 
underestimates IRR. Further analysis of the AIPP data finds that the top 5% of investments 
accounted for 57% of all return payouts.  
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The 2009 Wiltbank study, based on a survey of 158 UK-based angels, found a similar skewing of 
returns as the 2007 AIPP study: 56% of exits failed to return capital and 9% generated more than 
10x the capital invested. In this study, the original IRR was calculated at 22%. Revised calculations 
by RSCM (2010), using the same logic applied to the original AIPP data, used the average return 
multiple (2.2x) and the average holding period (3.6 years), which yields an average IRR of 24.6%; 
again, suggesting that the original study calculation underestimates IRR.  
 
Mason and Harrison’s 2002 study found that the distribution of returns was highly skewed, with 
34% of exits at a total loss, 13% at a partial loss or break-even, and 23% showing an IRR of at 
least 50%. Only 10% generated IRRs in excess of 100%. Further analysis of Mason and Harrison’s 
data (RSCM, 2010) attempted to determine IRR by making assumptions on each of five original 
performance-related data categories; yielding an average IRR of 37.4%.  
 
Despite the variation in underlying datasets and reported returns, certain conclusions may be drawn 
from prior studies. First, angel investing appears to generate a relatively high IRR, at least 
comparable with, or possibly exceeding, published returns from venture capital. Second, the data 
on group-based investing, which is somewhat analogous to portfolio investing, suggests the 
potential for higher returns. Third, broadly speaking, larger datasets appear to generate higher IRR 
estimates. 
 
3.1 Comparing Angel Returns with Venture Capital Returns 
 
The angel returns reported from prior studies are similar to VC returns in one respect, in that only a 
small percentage of investments generate the majority of liquidity. One difference is the wider 
variation in reported VC returns compared to angel returns. Bygrave and Timmons (1992) 
examined VC funds and found an average IRR based on net asset values of 13.5% for the years 
1974-1989. By comparison, Chen et al (2002) examined 148 VC funds using Thompson Venture 
Economics (TVE) data set that had been liquidated before 1999 and found an annual average return 
of 45% (with a standard deviation of 115%). Analysis of data from the Thomson Financial US 
Private Equity Performance Index found that returns to early stage VC investments over a twenty-
year period (1986-2006) were 20.5% (Cumming and Johan, 2010). Total VC returns for this same 
period were 16.5%.  
 
The high variability in reported VC returns is attributed to a number of factors that include superior 
market timing abilities of fund managers during the harvest phase of the fund (Diller and Kaserer, 
2009) and exogenous factors, such as the economic climate for initial public offerings (IPOs), 
which may drive exit valuations (Ball et al, 2011). Lerner et al (2007) suggest that VC fund 
performance is a good proxy for investor learning capacities. Other studies suggest that subsequent 
investments by an investor or group benefit from a learning and experiential effect (e.g. Harrison 
et al 2015; Wiltbank et al, 2009).  
 
Mason and Harrison’s 2002 study found that, compared to VCs, angels have fewer investments 
that lose money, a higher proportion of poor or moderately performing investments and a similar 
proportion of high-performance investments. They suggest that angels are more concerned with 
avoiding bad investments than ‘hitting a home run’’ because of their limited ability to diversify.  
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Given the high failure rate of early stage ventures, it is surprising that angels have fewer 
investments that lose money than VCs, e.g. Headd (2003) suggests that the failure rate of new 
business is estimated to range from 24% to 34% after two years, approximately 50% after four 
years, and approximately 60% after six years. Wiltbank and Boeker (2007) suggest that angel 
investors may positively influence their investment returns by increasing due diligence time, 
avoiding portfolios in unfamiliar industries, and actively participating with their portfolio 
companies at least a couple of times per month. One criticism of these findings, which are based 
on the AIPP data, is that it is not clear whether higher returns are a direct result of these angel 
activities (DeGennaro and Dwyer, 2014).  
 
Goldfarb et al. (2009) find that angel and VC deals have similar success rates when the amounts 
involved are smaller, but that angel-backed companies are more likely to become ‘living dead,’ 
with pure VC deals having a higher success rate when they involve larger sums. They conclude 
that entrepreneurs looking for more patient and less control-oriented investors seek angel financing 
whereas entrepreneurs looking for more managerial value-adding choose VCs. 
 
Wiltbank et al (2015) suggests that angel investment in the U.S. generates greater returns on capital 
than VC investment. The study is based on 3,160 private firms acquired by US-quoted corporations 
between 1996 and 2006. The authors also differentiate between two types of firms; high capital-
consumption firms, or ‘burners’, and low capital consumption firms, or ‘earners’, as shown in 
Table 2. Angel investment is predominantly with earners and VC investment with burners. Earners 
are more likely to fund growth with money from sales revenue and therefore require much less 
investment. Although they take much longer to reach an exit for the investors, the returns are 
significantly higher than for burners. Burners use large amounts of equity capital to fund growth 
but this significantly reduces their rate of return.  
 
Table 2: Comparing ‘Burner’ and ‘Earner’ Investment Returns   
‘Burners’ ‘Earners’ 
 
high capital consumption low capital consumption 
paid in capital $25 million $95k 
average growth rate 366% 151% 
total cash out $58.1 million $23.5 million 
years held 7.0 13.4 
return on capital 12.6% 50.7% 
 
In summarizing their findings, Wiltbank et al (2015) identify a strong ‘diminishing’ effect of paid-
in capital on valuations; in other words, additional capital beyond a certain point did not 
significantly influence total valuation of firms at time of acquisition. Their findings suggest the 
importance of ‘patient capital,’ commonly associated with angel investors (i.e. earners) and of 
company building activities over a longer time period and outwith the ‘high growth’ norms of PE 
investing, that may positively influence investment returns.  
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4 Method: Simulating Portfolio-based Angel Returns 
 
One important unresolved question from prior studies and the literature regards investment 
portfolio diversification. There is no definitive benchmark for how many investments improve the 
risk/reward profile, although previous studies and industry experts suggest a minimum of 12 to 20 
investments (e.g. Teten 2013; Wiltbank, 2012).  
 
To inform a deeper understanding of portfolio-based angel investing, we employ monte carlo 
simulation on one of the largest angel investment datasets to generate millions of hypothetical 
angel investment portfolios of varying sizes and characteristics. Monte carlo simulation is a proven 
method for exploring population dynamics and probabilistic outcomes when data is difficult to 
obtain (Mooney 1997). The analysis is inherently limited by how well the dataset represents the 
full population of angel investments, but provides important insight beyond prior studies that only 
report IRR for the dataset as a whole. 
 
We frame our simulation of angel returns within portfolio theory, which suggests that the risk of 
poor returns is reduced when multiple investments are made to ‘spread’ the risk and reap the 
benefits of diversification of different investment opportunities (Elton and Gruber, 1995). The 
theory suggests two elements of risk in an equity investment; the first being market risk, which is 
systematic and cannot be eliminated. The second risk is firm specific, which is non-systematic and 
can be reduced by holding a diversified portfolio. Within a well-balanced portfolio of investments, 
the theory suggests the existence of a minimum level of co-variance between the different 
investments (Markowitz, 1959).  
 
It is important to note that angel investing does not meet the stringent requirements for efficient 
markets. Investments are highly illiquid, difficult or impossible to objectively value, limited in 
number and access, and extremely idiosyncratic. The angel investing data demonstrates high 
returns variability across individual investments. Our application of “portfolio” theory is therefore 
limited to diversification to reduce risk via increasing the investment pool. We do not suggest that 
angel investing may be placed on the efficient frontier in a CAPM analysis. Nor do we explicitly 
address how angel investing deviates from CAPM with reference to other investment classes or 
types.  
 
Our goal is narrowly focused on assessing the potential to reduce returns variability by increasing 
the size of the investment portfolio. Given the high levels of variability reported for individual 
angel investment returns, we hypothesize that much larger portfolio size (N > 25) is required to 
provide significant protection against returns variability and low IRR portfolio outcomes. 
 
4.1 Dataset  
 
To test this hypothesis, we use data from the largest of the angel returns studies, the Angel Investor 
Performance Project (AIPP) dataset, to populate a monte carlo simulation of returns profiles based 
on portfolio size. For ease and simplicity, we used a publicly available version of the AIPP dataset 
published via Right Side Capital Management.  
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Original AIPP data were collected online through a questionnaire that asked for information on 
the investors’ experience, the ventures in which they had invested, and details about their 
investment in and exit from those ventures. The data contains survey responses from 86 angel 
groups totaling 539 investors who had made 3097 investments, with 1137 exits identified from 
those investments: 8% of exits occurred prior to 2000; 30% of exits were from 2000 to 2003; and 
the remaining exits were since 2004; 90% of the initial investments occurred after 1994, and 65% 
were initiated after 1999. 
 
A number of limitations should be acknowledged with the AIPP dataset. All respondents are 
members of angel groups; therefore, the dataset does not capture individual accredited angel 
investors and cannot be considered representative of angels in general. The average response rate 
from the angel groups (n=86) was 31% and the average response rate of members of those groups 
(N=539) was only 13%, suggesting that survey respondents may not be representative of the angel 
groups.  
 
This raises the possibility of selection bias, also suggested by DeGennaro and Dwyer (2009), 
whereby respondents are those reporting good investment outcomes, with those with poor 
outcomes not responding. Wiltbank and Boeker (2007) acknowledge that generalization of 
findings should focus exclusively on angel investors who operate in groups. Selection bias is also 
suggested in the high percentage of AIPP investments that resulted in an IPO, which may inflate 
the reported performance of the angel groups which participated in the AIPP. 
 
The publicly available version of the dataset had already been cleaned as follows: 
o Some records showed investments with no start date or investment amount. These records were 
removed. 
o Some records showed investments with a follow-on investment occurring prior to the original 
investment. These records were removed. 
 
To implement monte carlo simulation, additional preparation of the dataset was required: 
o Some records show a follow-on investment with no start year. A start year was calculated 
halfway between the latest investment and the exit year. 
o Some records show a “mid-cash return” in which a net inflow was recorded without a date. A 
date for these was calculated as halfway between initial investment and exit year. 
o Most records show an exit cash amount (failed investments show a “zero”). Seven records 
showed investments with zero cash in the “total return” field but no numerical amount in the 
exit cash field. Given the total return was zero, we entered zero for the exit cash for these 
records. 
 
Two additional notes should be made about the dataset: 
o One record shows a $10,000 investment and a $2.4M return in the same year. As reported in 
Wiltbank & Boeker (2007), the IRR of the dataset is approximately 31%. This single 
investment represents nearly one-third of that total return. Without this investment, the IRR of 
the dataset falls to 22%. While this is not necessarily a problem in the dataset, it is worth noting 
for the simulation. When this investment is selected into a portfolio, especially a small 
portfolio, simulation necessarily reports extraordinarily high returns. 
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o Of the 452 records in the dataset, 448 show investments that either pay out within 13 years or 
do not pay out at all.  Four investments show a positive payout after 13 years. One pays out 
after 17 years, two after 25 years, and one after 35 years. The collective IRR of these long-
hold investments is 11%. Excluding them from the dataset does not significantly change the 
measured return of the dataset. Including them significantly impacts MIRR calculations, 
however, as we will discuss. 
 
4.2 Simulation Method 
 
The monte carlo simulation process is briefly explained here. The simulation varies portfolio size, 
which ranges from 5 to 450 investments. Small portfolios generate effectively random return rates 
because of the high variability in returns of individual investments; we determined that there was 
no obvious value in generating portfolios of less than 5 investments. As the dataset includes 
approximately 450 investments, portfolios with more than 450 investments would not be expected 
to generate significantly different results. 
 
For a given portfolio size (e.g. 50 investments), the simulation uses Excel’s (pseudo) random 
number generator (McCullough & Heiser 2008) to select investments from the dataset of 448 
investments. Excel generates a number between 1 and 448; that investment is copied from the 
dataset to the portfolio under construction. This is repeated as many times as needed to complete 
the portfolio given the portfolio size (e.g. 50 investments). Once the first portfolio is generated, 
average and median IRR and MIRR are calculated and recorded for that portfolio. The portfolio is 
then cleared, and a new portfolio is generated. This is repeated 1000 times to generate a returns 
"profile" for that specific size of portfolio. We specifically record the IRR and MIRR profiles as 
the percent of portfolios within specific categories (<0%, 0-10%, 10-20%, 20-35%, 35-50%, 50-
75%, 75-100%, 100-250%, 250-500%, >500%). 
 
We run this analysis for portfolio sizes from 5 to 450 investments in increments of 5 investments. 
This generates a total of 20,475,000 investments across 90,000 portfolios. 
 
We sampled "with replacement." This means that each random investment selection chosen for 
the portfolio comes from the full dataset. A portfolio may therefore have multiple "copies" of the 
same investment. This sampling method ensures that portfolios are fully random reflections of the 
population distribution. Sampling "without replacement" means that once an investment has been 
selected into a portfolio it cannot be selected again for the same portfolio. This avoids duplicating 
investments within a portfolio, which might seem intuitively attractive. However, sampling 
without replacement requires the assumption that the data sample is not just representative of the 
population, but a perfect replica of the underlying probability distribution of possible investments. 
It requires that the selection of the same number of investments as the original dataset would be 
guaranteed to generate exactly the same returns outcome. Sampling with replacement only requires 
that the dataset is representative of the broader market, but allows for each marginal investment to 
be selected from the full population. 
 
All prior studies rely on IRR to report returns, but we calculate both IRR and MIRR, based on the 
understanding that a given portfolio might represent the full set of angel investments available to 
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a given investor or group. MIRR accounts for variation in time horizons by requiring that cash 
returns be reinvested at an available reinvestment rate rather than the project IRR.  
 
The full run parameters are as follows: 
o Capital cost (for MIRR analysis) is set at 5%. This assumes that angels have an effectively 
infinite source of marginal capital at a relatively low cost. We assume that investors effectively 
set aside a pool of funds or can access funds via relatively low-cost borrowing methods (e.g. 
mortgage interest rate). In reality, because most of the investment outflows happen early in 
each portfolio, varying this parameter has little to no impact on the results. 
o Reinvestment rate (for MIRR analysis) is set to 5%, 10%, 25%, 30%, and 35%. This facilitates 
exploration of outcomes when angels are required to reinvest cash inflows at rates below the 
previously reported returns of angel investing activity. 
o Portfolio size varies from 5 investments to 450 investments in increments of 5 investments 
(e.g. 5, 10, 15, 20… 440, 445, 450 investments). 
 
One additional note is required with regard to MIRR calculations. Because the investments vary 
in total hold time, portfolio returns necessarily reflect the hold time of the longest held investment 
in a generated portfolio. As discussed previously, we excluded the four investments that are held 
beyond 13 years. 
 
 
5 Results  
 
To explain the results, we first provide a specific example of a portfolio, then an example of a 
portfolio simulation, and then the full results of the analysis. 
 
Sample portfolio 
Table 3 shows a sample portfolio generated by the analysis for a portfolio of 10 investments. We 
use an example with relatively few investments only because a table with many investments is 
difficult to provide in print. As explained previously, this portfolio was generated via the random 
selection of 10 investments from the full dataset. Certain characteristics of this portfolio should be 
noted. Every investment had some type of positive payout, even if that payout did not repay the 
full investment (total net cash <0).  
 
Roughly 20% of the entire dataset had no positive payouts at all, resulting in the total loss of the 
investment. The IRR of this portfolio is 10.8%. For a reinvestment rate of 25%, the MIRR of this 
portfolio is 13.1%. 
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Table 3: Sample 10 investment portfolio generated randomly from full dataset 
 Year 
Investment# 0 1 2 3 4 5 
1 -25000  4000 3001   
2 -15000 613 1801    
3 -425000    1430000  
4 -100000     51000 
5 -20000 80000     
6 -20000    40949  
7 -300000     316000 
8 -250000 -100000 75000    
9 -300000     316000 
10 -25000   56780   
TOTAL -1480000 -19387 80801 59781 1470949 683000 
 
Portfolio simulation 
We now construct 999 more portfolios, each of which includes 10 investments, randomly selected 
from the dataset. Table 4 shows the returns profile of that simulation of 1000 portfolios of 10 
investments each. The average and median IRR for 10 investments are 158.7% and 20.8% 
respectively. The average IRR for this portfolio is very high because there are portfolios with very 
high IRRs. The highest portfolio return was 2264.55%. It should be noted that 32 out of 1000 
portfolios in this simulation do not have a reported IRR because the IRR calculation failed, either 
because the portfolio was all negative or all positive cash flows.  
 
The IRR returns profile for the simulation shows 28.3% of portfolios generated IRR below 0%; 
9.0% of portfolios generated IRR between 10% and 20%; 11.3% of portfolios generated IRR 
between 10% and 20%; 16.0% of portfolios generated IRR between 20% and 35%; 12.9% of 
portfolios generated IRR between 35% and 50%; 9.3% of portfolios generated IRR between 50% 
and 75%; 4.8% of portfolios generated IRR between 75% and 100%; 5.0% of portfolios generated 
IRR between 100% and 250%; .8% of portfolios generated IRR between 250% and 500%; and 
2.56% of portfolios generated IRR >500%. 
 
Analogous information for the MIRR returns profile shows that average and median MIRR for 10 
investments are 121.55% and 22.3% respectively. Again, the average MIRR for this portfolio is 
very high because there are portfolios with very high MIRR. The highest portfolio return was 
302.5%. It should be noted that 3 out of 1000 portfolios do not have a reported MIRR because the 
calculation failed, either because the portfolio was all negative or all positive cash flows. The IRR 
and MIRR returns profile for portfolios of 10 investments are compared visually in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: MIRR and IRR returns profiles for portfolios with 10 investments 
The IRR analysis shows many more low returns portfolios (<0%) as well as many more high 
returns portfolios (>100%), as we would expect. For portfolios with longer hold time investments, 
MIRR will tend to converge to the reinvestment rate. This is an important observation that will be 
discussed in more detail. 
 
5.1 Full analysis results 
 
Now that we have explored the results for one portfolio size (10 investments) we can show the 
results of the full analysis simulating the same process across all portfolio sizes and for different 
reinvestment rates. First, we will show the result of varying portfolio size. Portfolio size varies 
from 5 investments to 450 investments. For this analysis, reinvestment rate is 15%, on the 
assumption that this represents a not-unreasonable returns goal for a high net worth individual 
investor with a large, diversified portfolio. The average and median IRR and MIRR across 
portfolio size are shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Average & Median MIRR, IRR across portfolio size (reinvestment rate=15%) 
One of the more intriguing results of the simulation is the effect of portfolio size for very small 
portfolios (<20 investments). Average IRR actually rises initially from the smallest portfolios and 
peaks around 75 portfolios. This emphasizes the significant variation in portfolios and the fact that 
only a few investments generate the vast majority of returns. Following the peak, average IRR 
drops through portfolio sizes until it levels out to the anticipated average of about 32%, the IRR 
of the full dataset. Average MIRR for small portfolios starts below the dataset average return, 
rising to a lower average which reflects the effect of the reinvestment rate (15%). Median IRR and 
MIRR start below the expected average and slowly converge to the average as portfolio size 
increases. 
 
The portfolios returns profiles results are provided for IRR in Figure 3 and MIRR in Figure 4. 
Please note that these are simple extensions of the column charts shown in Figure 1, with data 
across all portfolios sizes (5 to 450 investments). 
 
Figure 3: IRR returns profile 
Figure 4: MIRR returns profile for reinvestment rate = 15% 
As expected, IRR and MIRR measurements vary more widely for small portfolios than large 
portfolios, as shown in Figures 3 and 4. For small portfolio sizes, the results show many more 
portfolios with returns below 0% or greater than 100%. 
 
We now consider the results of varying the reinvestment rate. We do not need to re-run the analysis 
for IRR; because IRR is calculated without an exogenous reinvestment rate (IRR assumes a 
reinvestment rate equal to the calculated IRR). 
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We reran the entire analysis with reinvestment rates of 5%, 15%, and 35%. Figure 5 shows the 
average MIRR across the varying reinvestment rates. Median MIRRs are not shown because they 
are not significantly different.  
 
Figure 5: Average MIRR across reinvestment rates 5% - 35% 
Effect of deal size 
Additional data visualizations are useful in presenting simulation findings. Figure 6 plots all of the 
investments to compare total investment amount and total return. We have overlaid the linear and 
2nd order trend lines to show the best fit correlating investment and return. 
 
Figure 6: Return vs. investment for full dataset 
One problem with this analysis is that the largest cash investments and exit values span six orders 
of magnitude. To ensure that outliers were not obscuring a possible size-return relationship, we 
removed the six largest investments (most of which failed) and the five largest cash outs from the 
analysis. Doing so does not significantly change the results, shown visually in Figure 7. The linear 
trend and trend line fit are effectively unchanged. Evidence for an investment size – return 
relationship is very limited. Caution must be taken in applying causal relationships to these effects, 
but the first order conclusions appear relatively straightforward. 
 
Figure 7: Return vs. investment for dataset without outliers 
 
6 Discussion 
 
Discussion of findings are structured around three themes: deal-size vs. returns, portfolio-based 
angel investing, and practice and policy considerations. 
 
6.1 Deal size 
 
A key debate in angel investing is the potential link between deal size and returns. As noted 
previously, angels and entrepreneurs often attribute venture failure to underfunding. A mantra of 
risk capital is “too little funding is worse than no funding at all.” This is based on the argument 
that underfunding a venture ensures failure because the organization will use the capital but fail to 
bring a viable product to market. Although angel investments usually incur smaller deal transaction 
costs than VC funding events (Mason and Harrison, 1996), diligence and transaction costs are 
relatively deal-independent. This again suggests that larger deals are more efficient. This economic 
reality has fueled significant increases in the average VC deal size (Sohl, 2003). 
 
If a strong causal link existed between deal size and returns, we would expect to see some evidence 
of this in the AIPP dataset. The data suggests that size-return correlation for angel investments is 
modest, at best, or nonexistent. Figure 6 shows the raw correlation between investment capital and 
cash out. The correlation is positive but less than 1. More importantly, the linear trend is, 
statistically, a poor predictor of outcome (R2 = .03). A polynomial trend line marginally better fits 
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the data (R2 = .08), but only because of the outlier investments above $2.5M that generated no 
returns. This result suggests that beyond a certain point, increasing angel investment size may 
actually generate lower returns. Removing the outliers, as previously noted, does not significantly 
change the results, as shown in Figure 7. The linear trend and trend line fit are effectively 
unchanged. Evidence for an investment size-return relationship is very limited. Caution must be 
taken in applying causal interpretations to these effects, in particular because the models cannot 
be thoroughly tested for significance. No other variables or factors were incorporated into the 
model. The analysis is only intended to suggest that the investment size-return relationship 
proposed in prior studies is not clearly supported by the AIPP dataset.  
 
This is a potentially disheartening result for policymakers focused on co-investment mechanisms 
intended to increase deal size. Government-sponsored co-investment has been suggested as a 
viable mechanism to increase the impact of angel investing and facilitate more fast-growth 
entrepreneurial activity without significant diligence costs or the political issues associated with 
state-run venture funds (Baldock and Mason, 2015). The dataset does not appear to support such 
policies based purely on increasing deal size. 
 
At the same time, our analysis cannot address hypothetical or counterfactual outcomes. It does not 
show whether increasing the size of a specific deal would generate higher returns or not. The 
analysis assumes a relatively efficient market for angel investment deals: on average good deals 
are funded and, pari passu, bad deals are not. In entrepreneurial ecosystems with below-market 
levels of available angel capital, co-sponsoring deals might be an effective mechanism to raise the 
rate of angel-funded entrepreneurial activity. Because angel investing tends to be more local and 
regional than organized VC, state-sponsored co-investing might effectively target areas with 
below-market levels of angel capital to encourage high-growth venture activity. Clearly, further 
research on this particular relationship is required. 
 
6.2 Portfolio returns to angel investing 
 
As expected, portfolios with roughly the same number of investments as the full dataset show the 
same average returns when calculated with IRR (32%). Of much more interest are the profile of 
large portfolios, the expected returns to smaller portfolios, and the implications of using MIRR 
rather than IRR as the metric. We discuss each in turn. 
 
Risk-return profile of large portfolios 
The simulation facilitates a much more sophisticated approach to understanding expected returns 
than a simple IRR calculation of the entire dataset. Figure 2 shows that while the average IRR of 
very large portfolios is as expected, the median IRR is rising to roughly the same level from much 
lower numbers. At 450 investments, the median IRR is below 30%. In other words, even at this 
very large portfolio size, outlier portfolios with high returns are skewing the average return higher. 
We can see this visually in Figure 3. The majority of portfolios generated (N=450 at the far right 
side of the graph) fall into the 20%<IRR<35% range. Approximately 30% of the portfolios 
generate IRRs greater than 35%, including approximately 5% of portfolios generating returns 
greater than 75%. No portfolios generate negative returns, and about 20% of portfolios generate 
IRRs between 0-20%.  
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We suggest that these are key findings. Assuming that the dataset is a reasonable representation of 
the underlying population of angel investments, the analysis suggests that it may be effectively 
impossible to reduce the risk of generating poor risk-adjusted returns, even without addressing the 
reinvestment rate issue. Most practitioners and scholars have argued that angel investing is 
inherently riskier than VC investing due to multiple factors, including less professional deal vetting 
and diligence, less effective deal negotiation, and more uncertainty associated with technology and 
market (e.g. Mason and Harrison, 2004). Angel investors and policymakers should be aware that 
while the risks of poor returns (<20%) can be mitigated by increasing portfolio size, they cannot 
be eliminated altogether. 
 
Returns profile of smaller portfolios 
Findings reveal that the risks and returns increase as portfolio size decreases, as expected. The 
effect of average IRR becomes evident when portfolio size falls below 200 investments. It is 
important to note, however, that while the average IRR at 200 investments is roughly the same as 
for 450 investment, the returns profile is actually quite different. At 200 investments, 
approximately 1/3 of portfolios generate 20%<IRR<35%. While the total number of 
outperforming portfolios has remained relatively constant, the number of significantly 
outperforming portfolios (IRR > 75%) and the number of underperforming portfolios (IRR<20%) 
both increase. The median IRR has fallen to about 28%. 
 
Between 200 and 100 investments per portfolio, the average IRR rises to approximately 40%, 
while median IRR continues to fall to roughly 25%. The returns profile is even more revealing. 
Nearly 40% of all portfolios generate returns below 20%, and more than 10% of all portfolios 
generate returns below 10%. At 50 investments per portfolios, the average IRR approaches 45%. 
Now nearly 20% of all portfolios are generating returns below 10%. This escalates rapidly as 
portfolio size approaches the level recommended by prior research. At 20-25 investments, average 
IRR actually may exceed 50%, but 30% of all portfolios are generating returns below 10%. In fact, 
roughly 20% of all portfolios are generating negative IRR. 
 
Below 20 investments it should be clear that there is significant variability in results; 30% of all 
portfolios generate negative IRR; 40% of portfolios generate IRR between 0% and 35%; and 30% 
of portfolios generate returns above 35%. Roughly 20% of portfolios generate returns above 75% 
and nearly 10% generate returns above 100%.  
 
This key finding suggests that generating reasonable risk mitigation (reducing probability of 
negative or poor risk-adjusted returns) appears to require significantly more than the 12-20 
investments suggested by prior research. A minimum of 50 investments is required to bring the 
risk of IRR<10% below 1 in 5 portfolios. Portfolios size of 150 investment brings that risk below 
1 in 10 portfolios. The danger of small group or individual investing emerges when a very few 
success stories overshadow widespread failure. For example, assume that 100 angels each invest 
in 5 ventures. Only one or two (if any) angels would be likely to generate strong returns, while the 
vast majority would experience flat returns or total losses. Media and network-based attention on 
the successes would likely hide large cohorts of unsuccessful, discouraged individual angels 
unlikely to continue to make investments. 
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The simulation results suggest that consistently high angel returns requires a large, long-term 
effort. A few assumptions help clarify the underlying challenge to portfolio-based angel investing. 
Assuming that the average deal size is $500,000, an angel group would need to invest $50 million 
to have 90% certainty of achieving greater than 10% returns. If the group has 20 members, each 
must invest $2.5 million. While some leading angel groups, such as Band of Angels in the U.S., 
may have the wherewithal to participate at this level, anecdotal evidence suggests that the vast 
majority of groups and angels are not this active. For example, the Central Texas Angel Network 
(CTAM) has invested $62 million from 140 angels across 110 companies. Since CTAM describes 
itself as one of the five most active networks in the U.S., it is probably safe to assume that the 
majority of angel networks in the U.S., and by extension the rest of the world, are not operating at 
large enough scale to ensure above average portfolio returns. 
 
Use of MIRR rather than IRR for angel portfolio returns 
The use of MIRR rather than IRR solves at least one returns measurement issue but generates 
additional problems. The significant advantage of MIRR lies in the ability to set a reinvestment 
rate rather than assume that positive cash flows may be reinvested at the same rate as the 
underlying investment. From a practical perspective, this simply means that as angels receive cash 
returns from investments they are always able to immediately re-invest those in opportunities with 
the same IRR expectations. 
 
This would seem to be, at face value, a flawed assumption. Our anecdotal observations of angel 
networks in the U.S., Canada, and UK suggest that angels do not generally have or exercise the 
option to immediately reinvest cash returns. Rather, individual investments are seen primarily as 
one-off investments, and positive cash flows from those investments are returned to the investors’ 
broader investment portfolio. The assumption is also problematic from a purely methodological 
standpoint. The simulation analysis requires that the portfolio automatically represents all of the 
angel investments being made by the individual or group. 
 
We explored the implications of using MIRR instead of IRR in the simulation. We used a “base” 
reinvestment rate of 15%, well below the average IRR of the entire dataset, but a not unreasonable 
upper level goal for an individual’s total investment portfolio. The results are striking, if not 
surprising. Average MIRR is significantly and consistently lower than average IRR, rising from 
approximately 13% at 5 investments to a stable rate of 20% by around 50 investments. The returns 
profile (Figure 4) shows how this stability forms across returns ranges. Once portfolio size reaches 
50 investments, less than 30% of portfolios generate returns below 20% and less than 15% of 
portfolios generate returns greater than 35%. 
 
Why does MIRR generate such different returns? We suggest the answer is in the investment hold 
time. Although some of the investments in the dataset exit quickly (within 5 years), many 
investments achieve exits after 5 years or after 10 years. Because we are evaluating the MIRR of 
the entire portfolio, the reinvestment rate comes into play for all investment returns through the 
year of the final exit event. The longer the hold time of the portfolio, the greater the effect of the 
reinvestment rate. 
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As shown in Figure 5, MIRR is driven significantly by the reinvestment rate, especially as portfolio 
size increases. This is an important observation, even if it follows in a more straightforward way 
from the mathematics. Understanding angel investing from a portfolio perspective requires careful 
considering of the reinvestment opportunities and alternative reinvestment rates. Imagine, for 
example, that an investor makes two investments of roughly equal size. One pays out well within 
2 years, but the other is held for more than 10 years. If the cash payment from the first investment 
is not reinvested in new angel deals, then the measurement of returns of the overall portfolio will 
likely be dominated by whatever rate of return the investor receives on the reinvestment of the 
funds generated by the first investment. 
 
6.3 Practice and Policy Considerations 
 
Our study generates three important recommendations for angels and angel groups. First, angels 
should fully appreciate the risk-reward profile of angel investing, including the benefits and 
limitations of portfolio-based investing. Simulation results clearly suggest that risk mitigation 
strategies are likely out of reach of most angel investors, including most “super-angels.” The 
portfolios size needed to achieve significant risk mitigation (>50 deals) is also greater than most 
angel groups attain. In comparing angel and VC risk-reward profiles and returns performance, we 
need to recognize differences that include VC fiduciary responsibilities to maximize returns (i.e. 
by GPs on behalf of their LPs), use of non-financial criteria in making investment decisions by 
angels, investment holding time differences, availability and deployment of value-added services, 
etc. (Cumming and Johan, 2010).  
 
Second, angels should be cognizant of the impact of reinvestment rate on returns calculations. 
Recent research suggests that angels are “patient investors” by default rather than plan. While this 
likely benefits individual ventures and entrepreneurs, the long hold time of angel investments may 
significantly reduce effective portfolio returns if positive cash flows are not being reinvested in a 
comparable asset class. Angel groups might consider fund pooling mechanisms and a rolling basis 
for investments to ensure that angels seeking to obtain the highest portfolio-based returns have the 
ability to make such reinvestments. 
 
Many angel investors and investing groups face the challenge of an escalation of commitment - 
the tendency to invest additional resources in an apparently losing proposition, influenced by 
effort, money, and time already invested (e.g. Staw 1981; Brockner 1992). Many ventures that 
receive angel funding will seek additional funding either as part of their planned growth strategy 
or as an unplanned reaction to unforeseen circumstances. As in the case of institutional venture 
capital (Birmingham et al 2003; Devigne et al 2016), angels that are already invested must 
carefully consider whether to reinvest. Reinvesting in such circumstances may therefore be subject 
to different criteria as compared to the initial investment decision and may protect their ownership 
share but increases total exposure. 
 
Finally, angels should employ a clear strategy with regard to deal size and total investment 
planning. We found no direct evidence of benefit from larger investments. While companies may 
fail without capital infusions, re-investment increases the hold time for deals that may already be 
in trouble, with the potential to significantly decrease portfolio returns. While further research is 
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clearly required, angels and angel groups would likely benefit from more explicit planning and 
expectations to maximize the impact of investment amounts and minimize the risk of poor long-
term return. 
 
Our study also generates three recommendations for policies which attempt to encourage and 
support angel investing. First, policymaking should focus on private, group-based investing rather 
than government-organized or widely distributed/isolated angel activity. Minimum scale for 
ensuring appropriate risk-adjusted returns exceeds the capacity of all but the wealthiest and long-
term focused investors. 
 
Second, government entities should be as focused on angel network longevity as investment 
activity. Angel networks that make less than 50 investments have roughly a 45% probability of 
generating IRR less than 20%, and roughly 20% probability of generating IRR below 10%, not 
accounting for reinvestment rate. Such networks may tend to be transient as disillusioned investors 
drop out or reduce their investment activity. Government entities might most effectively support 
network longevity through subsidized training, diligence costs, or even administrative support. 
Rather than co-invest in deals to increase deal size, public money may be better spent co-
sponsoring network administration to sustain networks and maximize investment learning. As 
mentioned earlier, a deal size-returns relationship suggested in prior studies is not clearly 
supported in our simulation results. 
 
Third, we acknowledge that tax incentives and co-investing represent potentially viable tools to 
encourage angel investing activity. Tax incentives help shield angels from losses associated with 
failed investments. Co-investing may give angels and angel groups more leverage in negotiating 
deals and ensuring that high-growth ventures raise enough money to reach key milestones. 
However, we caution that both have significant drawbacks. Co-investing may encourage larger 
investments that tie up disproportionate amounts of capital and tax incentives may attract less 
serious or capable investors seeking tax relief. 
 
Our study suggests that such tools could be used discriminately depending on the pool of available 
angel deals. Public entities might directly subsidize angel investing (tax incentives) while the 
population of opportunities is relatively low, because angels cannot easily reinvest positive funds 
in more deals. Tax incentives would offset the necessarily low return rate resulting from the 
requirement to reinvest proceeds in alternative asset classes with lower expected returns (e.g. 
mutual funds). Once the start-up population is large enough to enable the re-investment cycle, 
public entities could shift to co-investment to increase the number of investments. With a larger 
pool of deals available, co-investment could help angels and angel groups quickly reinvest positive 
returns. 
 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
This paper addressed the question of whether angel investing generates attractive returns.  Given 
the high levels of variability reported for individual angel investment returns, we hypothesized that 
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much larger portfolio size (N > 25) is required to provide significant protection against returns 
variability and low IRR portfolio outcomes. Our study offers a number of contributions.  
 
First, we extend prior studies that examine angel returns by exploring the link between portfolio 
size and investment returns. Monte carlo simulation of data from the largest angel returns study to 
date (AIPP) further emphasizes the high risks associated with angel investing and empirically 
validates investment challenges faced by individual angels and small angel networks in attempting 
to generate attractive returns. Our study provides further evidence that large successes and exits 
are not representative of typical angel investments.  
 
Second, in contrast with prior studies, we show that portfolios with more than 50 investments are 
required to significantly minimize risk of poor returns. We show that similar scale is required to 
maximize returns potential, as smaller portfolios also have a lower average IRR. This has 
important implications for angel investing practice, where achieving attractive returns favors 
angels in larger, established angel groups over individual angels, or angels in smaller groups.  
 
Third, we show that reinvestment rate is a critical element in measuring angel returns. If angels 
can reinvest cash returns in more, comparable investments, then portfolio returns may actually be 
slightly higher than previously reported. If angels cannot constantly reinvest cash returns in more 
investments, then real portfolio returns are significantly lower than previously reported.  
 
Fourth, we show that public policies to stimulate larger angel investments may be misguided, as 
our findings do not support arguments linking deal size to returns. We encourage policymakers, 
who reasonably view angel investing as an important component of economic development policy, 
to focus more on angel network syndication and network longevity, rather than deal size and tax 
incentives for loss-reduction.  
 
7.1 Limitations and future research 
 
We suggest that simulation analysis represents a powerful tool for exploring portfolio-based 
returns to angel investing. At the same time, it incurs specific limitations that should be carefully 
considered. The simulation is restricted to the investment sample of the database and the accuracy 
of the simulation results are limited by how effectively the sample replicates the real population 
of angel investments. The authors suspect that this dataset, along with most other angel datasets in 
the literature, over-represents relatively high-profile, sophisticated angel investors and is further 
characterized by systematic upward bias in reported returns. 
 
This supports the view of DeGenarro and Dwyer (2014), who suggest the angel groups who 
participated in the AIPP study are not a random sample of all angel investors. They identify the 
high percentage of investments in the study that resulted in an IPO, but found that many angels in 
the AIPP data invested in the same IPO, with 13 of the 56 IPO investments being the same deal. 
We postulate that the returns reported in most angel investment research are over-estimates of the 
full population of angel investing activity. We suggest that large scale estimation of the real 
population of angels’ deals is urgently required to confirm whether extant dataset samples are 
representative or not. We strongly encourage researchers with proprietary datasets to consider 
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pooling such datasets, both to examine subpopulation differences as well as to enable more 
powerful and sophisticated simulation procedures.  
 
Aside from the research opportunities already developed, we suggest five themes for further study. 
First, MIRR-based results are directly affected by total portfolio hold time. While this is a 
fundamental limitation of the calculation, it could be possible to explore the implications of setting 
(arbitrary) hold times for investment planning purposes. We would expect that overly short hold 
times would reduce returns, there might be an optimal time frame for portfolio planning, given 
that long hold times reduces MIRR to the reinvestment rate. In other words, we expect that the 
relationship of MIRR to hold time would be an inverted “U” shape, and that it may be possible to 
estimate an optimal hold period for angel investments from a portfolio-based perspective. 
 
Second, this study and all of the prior angel returns studies have calculated IRR/MIRR for 
portfolios in which all investments occur in Year 0. While this is an extremely convenient 
approach, it is prima facie wrong. Neither angels nor angel groups make all investments in one 
year. Investments tend to be spread out over extended lengths of time. Again, it is unclear what 
the implications are for overall portfolio returns, but it should be investigated. 
 
Third, the analysis presented does not take into account tax implications. Positive cash returns 
should generally be expected to be taxed at a prevailing capital gains rate (15% for long-term gains 
in the U.S.); investment losses generate a tax benefit. This process would decrease the value of 
short term gains and increase the value of short and medium-term losses. The implications for total 
portfolio returns are difficult to predict, but should be investigated. 
 
Fourth, a key question for angel portfolio investing is the extent to which escalation of commitment 
occurs as a self-justificatory strategy (Brockner 1992), and if so, whether this escalating 
commitment has positive or negative implications for overall portfolio investment returns. We 
were not able to address this question directly in our current treatment, but anticipate addressing it 
in a follow-up study. 
 
Finally, the AIPP dataset does not provide information to measure possible learning effects, so the 
simulation effectively treats all investments as equally likely. DeGenarro and Dwyer (2014) 
specifically suggest that syndicate-based learning results in significantly higher investment 
returns. The form of learning may be explicit or tacit knowledge, or even encoded within the 
syndicate’s network of internal or external relationships. Regardless, such learning effects are only 
accessible if the network retains enough investors to make investments and maintain infrastructure 
to store and extract learning as needed by investors. This suggests that smaller angel networks may 
benefit from actively seeking to share diligence and syndication of deals with other angel networks. 
The relationship between learning effects and returns across different angel groups is a potentially 
promising area for further study.  
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Figure 1: MIRR and IRR returns profiles for portfolios with 10 investments 
 
 
Figure 2: Average & Median MIRR, IRR across portfolio size (reinvestment rate=15%) 
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Figure 3: IRR returns profile
 
Figure 4: MIRR returns profile for reinvestment rate = 15% 
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Figure 5: Average MIRR across reinvestment rates 5% - 35% 
 
 
Figure 6: Return vs. investment for full dataset 
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Figure 7: Return vs. investment for dataset without outliers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
